In this paper we provide evidence from Japan that bears on a general theory of agenda power in legislatures. By agenda power we mean the power to determine: (a) which bills are considered in the plenary session of the legislature and (b) restrictions on debate and amendment to these bills, when they are considered. While a substantial amount of work has focused on the second category of agenda power, including studies of special rules in the US House (e.g., Sinclair forthcoming), (...) closure in the UK House of Commons (e.g., Cox, 1987; Dion, 1997), and the guillotine in the French National Assembly (e.g., Huber, 1996), there is very little on the first and arguably more fundamental sort of agenda power. This agenda power is our focus here, and henceforth when we refer to we shall mean this narrower conception. (shrink)

Twentieth-century dispositions to model human cognition as logical systems have been undermined by evidence from the wild. Formal models of cognition as symbolic, algorithmic, internally consistent, disembodied, and sequentially marching through linear inference are not ecologically valid and are being replaced by pragmatic, usage-based theories, most notably in linguistics. In this article, we argue that game-theoretic models of human collective action must find new foundations, given the evidence that human behavior in experimental settings and in the wild does not conform (...) to theoretical predictions. We propose an alternative, pragmatic theory of decision-making, founded on different conceptions of selves and decisions, conceptions that are consistent with new cognitive neuroscience. (shrink)